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The Sovereignty of the Judiciary * 
Terence G. ISON ** 
Cet article discute d'abord des problèmes que pose le contrôle judiciaire en 
général. Il explique pourquoi l'expansion de celui-ci ne peut se justifier pour les 
raisons habituellement invoquées à cet effet. 
Depuis l'avènement de la Charte canadienne des droits, ces problèmes se 
sont accrus. Selon l'auteur, la Charte est une erreur: elle est source de 
gaspillage et elle menace l'intérêt public sans vraiment protéger les droits de la 
personne. En même temps, explique l'auteur, nous avons raté une occasion des 
plus propices d'utiliser les cours de justice de façon conforme à l'intérêt public. 
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Introduction 
My subject is systems of appeal and review in relation to public 
administration, and in particular the uses and limitations of courts. 
Let me begin with the background context. A matter that must surely be 
of concern is the gulf, and possibly the widening gulf, between our political 
ideology and the realities of the political process. Our governments are 
self-proclaimed democracies, and yet the democratic component within 
them is subject to such enormous pressures that the key decisions in public 
policy seldom appear to be the output of any democratic choice. 
The world is threatened with annihilation by weapons of genocidal 
magnitude; yet the perceived solution is more weapons of even greater 
genocidal magnitude. Despite the manifest insanity of the Star Wars 
program, we are being drawn inexorably into it, and no opinion among the 
electorate would be likely to make any difference. 
Similarly with regard to pollution, the majority of the population has 
wanted tighter controls ' yet the Great Lakes have become the toxic 
cesspools of North America just as the Baltic Sea has become the toxic 
cesspool of Europe, and even the peaks of the Rocky Mountains are now 
shrouded by air-borne pollution. 
We have massive unemployment, largely the predictable result of 
advancing technology, and yet all political parties seem dedicated to the 
absurdity that the solution to unemployment is more jobs. 
The theme that I want to develop is that the same irrational pressures 
that have produced these results have also threatened and constrained the 
democratic process in other ways, including the widespread expansion of 
judicial review2. In Canada, this has now been enhanced by the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms', which expands judicial review in relation to legislation 
and executive action. 
1. The problems with judicial review 
The main concern is that judicial review rests upon a misconception of 
the basic problems in public administration, and that it tends to aggravate 
1. This is supported by various opinion polls. See e.g., Reduce Canadian-Made Acid Rain — 
86 Percent, The Gallup Report, 19th December 1983. 
2. As well as court decisions over-riding the privative clauses, judicial review has received an 
impetus from legislative changes. See e.g., Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1980, 
c. 224 ; Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 484. 
3. Canada Act, U.K. Statutes, 1982, c. 11, Part I, Schedule B. 
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rather than mitigate those problems. With regard to the regulatory agencies 
and tribunals, judicial review could make sense if they consisted of enthu-
siastic people wielding power and who were carried away with excessive zeal, 
pursuing public policy objectives regardless of the extent to which they 
trampled on private rights. That, however, is not the way it is. A conscientious 
public servant who faithfully strives to fulfil his mandate, perhaps by 
controlling pollution, can expect to face challenges or obstruction from 
budget committees, from legislative counsel, from officials of the Ministry of 
the Attorney-General, from the Auditor-General, from the media, possibly 
from the Ombudsman, from various vested interests, and perhaps from the 
courts. A public servant in an environmental protection agency who is more 
disposed to inertia and who engages in a program of minimal or useless 
activity may face some criticisms, but not usually from powerful sources, 
and he probably has a better prospect of a quiet life. 
The main problem in public administration is not the excess or abuse of 
power ; it is inertia and under-achievement through the under-use of power ; 
the failure to engage in the conscientious pursuit of public policy objectives. 
By focussing on the control of excess or abuse, and failing to control under-
achievement, we have promoted to new heights the old common law view 
that misfeasance could be condemned in damages while non-feasance was 
immune. Judicial review tends to enhance the problem of under-achievement 
by adding another opportunity for obstruction by those against whom 
public power ought to be exercised. If we are to create a remedy for the basic 
problems in public administration, it must be one that induces the proper 
exercise of power, not one which, for the most part, simply adds another 
veto. 
Of course problems of excess and abuse of power exist. They are 
commonly found in the revenue departments and in those agencies that are 
intended to serve ordinary people, such as those administering social 
insurance and social security, and those that provide services to the elderly 
and the disabled. Yet even here, judicial review tends to aggravate rather 
than to correct the problems. 
Unfortunately, the judicialization movement has also spilled over into 
legislation. Judicial review has been so elevated to the status of a grand 
panacea and supported by such powerful interests that elected governments 
no longer feel that they have any choice but to allow appeals or reviews of 
tribunal decisions by courts of general jurisdiction. 
Examples can be seen in licensing systems, such as those relating to real 
estate agents, used car dealers, mortgage brokers, itinerant salesmen and 
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collection agencies. A classic Canadian case4 on licensing involved an 
alleged abuse by a provincial Premier resulting in the non-renewal of a liquor 
licence which the court concluded ought to have been renewed. 
The widespread problem with licensing, however, is not the refusal, 
revocation or non-renewal of licences. It is the failure to achieve the 
objectives of the licensing statute by granting and renewing licences as a 
standard routine without adequate systems of inspection or enquiry to 
generate possible suspensions or revocations. This widespread problem is 
commonly aggravated by legislative provisions for appeals against the 
refusal, revocation, suspension or non-renewal of a licence, but no appeal or 
comparable procedure when a licence is granted or renewed5. The influence 
of the judicial process on the licensing administrator then operates only one 
way : protecting private interests, but not protecting the public interests for 
which the licensing statute was passed in the first place. Similar examples can 
be found in relation to pollution control, and similar examples may exist in 
Australia6. 
Because it commonly operates only one way, and against the pursuit of 
public policy objectives, judicialization can tend to induce timidity in public 
administration and can enhance regulatory capture. As one of my colleagues 
put it : 
[...] the requirement of trial-type hearings and full-scale appeals may well have, 
from the point of view of a regulated industry, the desired effect of discouraging 
all but the most determined administrator by forcing him to focus his scarce 
resources on a relatively small number of cases so clear that they are likely to 
survive even judicial scrutiny. The public's interest in attaining regulatory 
objectives is, in the end, not likely to be served by appeals to ordinary law.' 
The negative influence of the judicialization movement has not only 
spilled over into legislation ; it has also spilled over into the legislative 
process, inducing a negative bias in the work of legislative drafters. For 
example, the regulations proposed by the line departments of government 
receive external scrutiny to ensure that they do not exceed the perceived 
authority of the enabling statutes or other constitutional constraints8 ; but 
there is no comparable provision for any external scrutiny to determine 
4. Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121. This case went to the court as a tort claim for 
damages. 
5. See e.g., Consumer Reporting Act, S.N.S. 1973, c. 4, as amended, s. 7(3). 
6. See e.g., Second Annual Report of the Administrative Review Council, 1978, Canberra, 
para. 48. 
7. H.W. ARTHURS, Without the Law, University of Toronto Press, 1985, p. 200. 
8. See e.g., Second Report on the Standing Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of 
Commons on Regulations and Other Statutory Instruments, 1977, Ottawa, heading B, 
para. 10. 
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whether the regulations proposed by the line departments are sufficient to 
achieve the public policy objectives of the enabling legislation. 
A key factor in the judicialization of public policy making is the 
dominance of the legal profession, and particularly the bench, in the control 
of value choices. The point was made by John Griffith in the English 
context. 
The higher judiciary comprises some one hundred persons, but the truly 
effective number of policy-makers in the Divisional Court, the Court of 
Appeal, and the House of Lords is fewer than thirty. These judges have, by their 
education and training and the pursuit of their profession as barristers, acquired a 
strikingly homogeneous collection of attitudes, beliefs and principles, which to 
them represent the public interest.9 
Even apart from socio-economic background, the career orientation of 
the judiciary militates against the pursuit of public policy objectives. They 
have generally been involved in individual cases for corporate or individual 
clients rather than in policy planning. Except for those whose careers have 
been in criminal law, few come from the public service. This may help to 
explain why the values primarily espoused in the court system appear to be 
private rights, and particularly private property rights. As a leading scholar 
has put it in relation to pollution control : 
The basic purpose of private civil actions and judicial review actions is to 
vindicate private property rights that are infringed or threatened by some other 
person, corporation, or public authority.'0 
Not only does the judicial process tend to prefer concentrated corporate 
interests over more dissipated public interests, but it also tends to prefer 
short-term over long-term interests. For example, a pollution control official 
who takes aggressive action to protect an immediate downstream or 
downwind interest from demonstrable harm can expect more support from 
the legal system than one who takes the same action to prevent the same 
pollution source from damaging human health by adding to the continental 
or global aggregate of toxic contamination. 
A related concern is the inequality of access to judicial review. "The 
wealthy litigant whose affairs are not disadvantaged by the need to resolve 
speedily the issue between him and his opponent has available the luxury of 
multiple opportunities to attempt the resolution of a dispute." ". The delay, 
9. J.A.G. GRIFFITH, The Politics of the Judiciary, Manchester University Press, 1977, p. 193. 
10. A.R. LUCAS, "Legal Foundations for Public Participation in Environmental Decision-
making", (1976) 16 Natural Resources JournalTi, p. 93. 
11. D. PEARCE, "Judicial Review of Tribunal Decisions — The Need for Restraint", (1981) 12 
Federal Law Review 167. 
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which is one factor causing the inequality of access, also produces inequality 
in the significance of the outcome. In Ontario, for example, it usually takes a 
year for an application for judicial review to be heard. This may not concern 
a corporate litigant if the transaction is small in relation to its total business ; 
but it can be disastrous for a small business person when the transaction in 
issue involves his total business, or for a pensioner when the issue involves 
his primary income. 
Where an appeal or review lies to a court of general jurisdiction from a 
specialized tribunal, this can undermine the very purpose of establishing the 
tribunal. A specialized tribunal may have been established not only to depart 
from the adversary system but also to develop the expertise in the subject 
matter required for the intelligent development of policy. Once it is 
recognized that appellate adjudication is policy making l2, it makes no sense 
to develop that expertise in a specialized tribunal and then have its decisions 
subject to appeal or review by a generalist tribunal, particularly if it is also 
more constrained in its procedures and resources. 
In any event, intelligent policy making cannot be undertaken by a 
tribunal whose interventions in a system are only episodic, and even then, 
not of its own choice. Intelligent policy making, which is part of system 
development, often requires co-ordination with budgeting and executive 
action. Sometimes it also requires co-ordination with other agencies of 
government. Above all, it often requires long-term planning. It is this 
ongoing and co-ordinating responsibility, perception of consequences and 
awareness of interactions that makes the ordinary courts unsuitable as policy 
makers in public administration. 
What is commonly involved in proceedings that are subject to judicial 
review is the interpretation of a statute and the development of a branch of 
public administration through a body of case law. This can only be done 
intelligently in the context of the universe that is affected by the system. If it 
is labour law, for example, the case law development must take place in the 
context of labour relations. The legal structure in other subject areas is much 
less significant. The crucial point is that statutory interpretation and case law 
development, if they are to be done intelligently, involve policy making. 
Thus if most decisions are made by a board, but some trickle through to 
courts of general jurisdiction, there are then two and sometimes more than 
two alternative and potentially rival sources of policy development. 
12. This proposition is gaining recognition, even among the judges. See e.g., D.G. BLAIR, "The 
Charter and the Judges : A View from the Bench", (1983) 13 Manitoba Law Journal 445, 
p. 449. 
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Related to this, judicial review or appeal structures also tend to divert 
legal work from the front line departments of governments to the central 
crown offices, particularly the Ministries of the Attorneys-General. Taking 
labour relations again as the example, tribunal cases may be assigned to 
lawyers in the Ministry of Labour, but once a case goes to a court of general 
jurisdiction of judicial review, it may then be perceived as a matter of 
administrative law, and therefore to be conducted by a lawyer in the 
Ministry of the Attorney-General. The result is likely to be the reinforcement 
of private law concepts in public administration, and a reduction of focus on 
public policy objectives. 
The propensity in judicial review to classify policy choices as questions 
of "law" can also tend to undermine consistency and co-ordination in the 
processes of government. To operate and develop a system intelligently 
usually requires consistency in the decision-making. To take an example 
familiar to me, suppose a workers' compensation statute is drafted to ensure 
that the taxi industry is included. Certain operators in the industry attempt 
some manipulations to avoid the coverage, but the board affirms that they 
are covered and consistently maintains that view. Taxi companies pay 
assessments for many years. Claims for workers in the industry are paid. 
Several pensions are being paid for permanent disability and some widows 
pensions are being paid. Then a particular taxi company retains a lawyer 
who thinks of a new way to argue against the coverage. The board rejects the 
argument, but on judicial review, the lawyer persuades the court to adopt his 
interpretation of the Act by referring to dictionary definitions that may 
make no sense in terms of the purposes of the legislation. The result could be 
chaotic, and it would elevate an abstract concept to a virtue for anyone to 
claim that the result was according to "law" 13. Of course the damage might 
be repaired by amendment of the Act, but only at substantial cost. 
Moreover, transitory damage will have been done and the same thing could 
recur as the courts deal episodically with other topics. 
Related to this, a conflict often arises between judges and others 
responsible for public administration with regard to categorical decision-
making. Those responsible for the design of a legislative, regulatory and 
administrative structure must decide to what extent the statutory provisions 
should be applied to people or situations classified by pre-determined 
criteria, and to what extent the decisions should vary according to additional 
facts present in each case. In making these choices, the system designer must 
consider problems of administrative feasibility and aggregate cost as well as 
individual rights. 
13. Fortunately, the courts have shown some consciousness of this problem and have shown 
considerable restraint with regard to workers' compensation. They have, however, not 
shown the same restraint with regard to labour relations. 
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This breadth of vision may induce a perceived need for categorical 
decision-making that is not appreciated subsequently by a judge of general 
jurisdiction, particularly if he has detailed evidence relating to sympathetic 
circumstances in the particular case. The result may be a temptation to 
produce a decision which cannot and probably should not be applied in 
other like cases, and hence which is incompatible with equality before the 
law. 
Another major problem with judicial review is the tendency to coerce 
the adversary system on other adjudicating tribunals. For a variety of 
reasons, a legislature may create a tribunal to adjudicate by an inquisitorial 
rather than an adversarial process, or to adjudicate in some other way. The 
government may want to avoid the cost of professional advocacy; it may 
want to upgrade the quality of investigation by combining that role with 
adjudication; it may wish to ensure that public policy objectives are not 
sacrificed to private interests ; it may wish to upgrade the sensitivity of 
adjudication by including field-work in the process ; or it may wish to ensure 
that adjudication is part of an on-going relationship. Whatever the reasons, 
judicial review can operate as a pressure against the legislative choice in 
favour of an inquisitorial or other system. 
Again, a reason for establishing a tribunal in the first place is commonly 
to permit the development of a structure and a procedure that are suited to 
the particular subject matter and that differ from the structures and 
procedures of courts and of other tribunals. Judicial review has a homo-
genizing influence that tends to defeat that objective. Judicial review does 
not require all tribunals to conduct their proceedings on an adversary model, 
but they are safer if they do. 
Regardless of the outcome of any proceedings, adherence to the 
adversary model by a tribunal tends to receive approbation in the courts. 
For example, where the same person is responsible for initiating and 
investigating as well as for deciding, this tends to be perceived in the courts 
as well as in the legal profession as a lower quality of adjudication. Thus in 
one recent case, the judge of a court labelled "superior" concluded that 
because an adjudicating tribunal did not always follow the adversary system 
but sometimes initiated inquiries on its own, its impartiality "may be open to 
some question" u . A tribunal established to proceed on an inquisitorial or 
other model may have to struggle against the tide if the integrity of that 
system is to survive the onslaught that it may receive from a legal profession 
dedicated to the adversarial process. 
14. Per Hinds J. in Levy et al. v. Friedmann, (1985) Supreme Court of British Columbia, 
unreported, Vancouver Registry No. A 841608, p. 17. 
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Even when a tribunal is wrong and a court has identified the error on 
judicial review, the dominating influence of the adversary system in judicial 
review can still lead to a wrong solution. An example familiar to me is a 
workers' compensation case in which the board, pursuant to its usual policy, 
had refused to disclose to a claimant the medical reports on file and which it 
was using in its adjudication. On judicial review, the court decided that the 
reports should be shown to the claimantl5. Of course that decision was right 
as far as it goes ; but it did not address the basic problems with the board 
policy and for that reason did not prescribe the appropriate solution. The 
decision only required medical reports to be disclosed to a claimant when 
there is a conflict requiring adjudication, and even then only at the appeal 
stage. There was no discussion in the court decision of whether medical 
reports ought to be disclosed to claimants at any time as a matter of basic 
human rights, or to facilitate patient choices in medical care, or for other 
purposes relating to their legal or political rights. When the court decision 
reached the board it was, predictably, interpreted as requiring that in the 
event of a medical issue arising on an appeal, the medical reports relating to 
a disabled worker must be disclosed to the employer as well as to the 
claimant16. Thus disclosure of personal medical information about a worker 
to his employer came about as an automatic response to the doctrinal and 
ideological demands of the adversary system without any assessment of the 
harm that might be done through such disclosure, and without any apparent 
value judgment on the measure of that harm compared with the benefit of 
adherence to the adversary model. 
The emphasis on the "hearing", which is a normal part of the adversary 
system, is sometimes inappropriate for tribunals where adjudication is part 
of a continuing process. For example, the payment of benefits to a 
compensation claimant and the provision of rehabilitation services may 
involve co-ordinated decisions made over several months or sometimes 
years. Similarly, the resolution of a pollution problem may involve integrated 
decisions made over a significant period of time. The same can be said of the 
regulation of telecommunications and of other industries where heavy 
investment depends upon tribunal decisions. Justice, efficiency, and consist-
ency as well as the achievement of public policy objectives can all be 
threatened if a tribunal, when adjudicating on a particular issue, is expected 
to confine itself to the evidence adduced at a hearing for the decision only of 
that case or issue. 
In some subject areas, such as social insurance, the concepts inherent in 
the adversary system may be inconsistent with the statutory structure that 
15. Re Napoli and Workers' Compensation Board, (1982) 126 D.L.R. (3d) 179. 
16. Decision No. 338, (1981) 5 Workers' Compensation Reporter 109. 
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was established. For example, if a claimant appeals from an initial decision 
to a tribunal, there is no general requirement for a "respondent", but the 
courts impose that requirement on judicial review. There may be no-one to 
fill that role except the social insurance agency itself, but to cast the agency 
in that role can be inconsistent with the demeanour and attitude that the 
agency was intended to adopt in the first place as an adjudicating tribunal in 
relation to claimants. 
Part of the blame for this dominance of the adversary system in legal 
process must surely rest on the faculties of law. Traditionally, the emphasis 
in the curriculum has been on private law subjects, and the contemporary 
pressure is to enhance the traditional view. The adversary system is 
commonly treated as a universal good, a model of decision-making for all 
subject areas and all adjudicating institutions. For the most part, graduating 
law students and those called to the bar are untrained in any other 
adjudicative model. 
Central to much of this subject area is the lawyer's perception of virtue 
in the separation of powers ; and yet many problems, including the control of 
toxic waste, will not be solved without a blending of investigation, regulation 
making, executive action and adjudication. It is hopeless to regulate and 
then leave the imposition of sanctions to the ordinary criminal courts ". 
Like other legal concepts, the separation of powers can be useful and 
positive in result if used discriminately to achieve articulated goals and with 
advertence to the consequences of its use. When broadened to a principle of 
universal application, however, it is bound to be destructive. Among other 
things, the resulting dispersal of responsibility can tend to facilitate useless 
political decisions involving hypocrisy and resulting in waste. In particular, 
it enables governments to pass regulatory legislation with the appearance of 
doing something to resolve a problem while the predictable result is no 
significant achievement,8. 
The separation of powers is related to other propensities in government 
to avoid a concentration of authority and to prefer decision-making 
processes that involve co-ordination among different people, departments 
and agencies. Yet as the chief executive of any major corporation could tell 
us, that is not the way to achieve efficiency. The history of personal injury 
compensation in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the U.K. illustrates 
17. See e.g., T.G. ISON, "The Uses and Limitations of Sanctions in Industrial Health and 
Safety", Item No. 158, (1975) 2 Workers' Compensation Reporter 203. 
18. Perhaps the classic example is legislation in Canada and perhaps other commonwealth 
countries relating to monopolies, mergers, and combinations in restraint of trade. 
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the point. Great progress has been made when one key figure on the 
government side with the imagination and the initiative has also received the 
power and authority to design and implement a major reform while the 
vested interests that have to be overcome have lacked a strategic command. 
Conversely, significant reform in this subject area has not been achieved 
when responsibility on the government side has been shared among different 
people, departments and agencies. 
The multiplicity of proceedings generated by judicial review, and by 
structures created in response to the risk of judicial review, can require 
co-ordination by people in different departments and agencies. This can 
extend the number and range of people from whom an affirmative decision is 
required for any effective action, and of course this dispersal of veto powers 
among government officials can increase the lobbying opportunities for 
vested interests. Moreover, the multiplicity of proceedings can multiply the 
total of decision-making costs. 
In many systems of public administration, consistency and integrity can 
be retained when the chairman of the final appeal tribunal also has executive 
authority in relation to primary adjudication. This can help to ensure that 
decisions made at the final level of appeal are followed in primary 
adjudication. Conversely, where the final appeal lies to a court of general 
jurisdiction, its decisions might be perceived by those operating the system as 
aberrational. Hence to prevent system deterioration or for other reasons, the 
agency may implement the decision in the particular case while carrying on 
as before in every other case ". When that happens, consistency and equality 
before the law have been sacrificed, and the system of appeal or review by a 
court of general jurisdiction is only a way of greasing a few squeaky wheels. 
The negative influence of judicial review can also be seen in the general 
legislation under which many tribunals must function. For example, in 
Ontario the Statutory Powers Procedure Act20 provides that a tribunal must, 
upon request, give reasons for its decision. The apparent purpose is to 
facilitate judicial review. To require reasons for decision only upon request 
ignores and detracts from the primary purpose of giving reasons, i.e., to 
ensure that reasons are articulated in the mind of the decision-maker before 
the decision is made, thereby enhancing the prospect that decisions will be 
made for reasons that can withstand reflection, at least in the mind of the 
decision-maker. 
19. An example of this is Re Proc and Minister of Community and Social Services, (1974) 53 
D.L.R. (3d) 512, dealing with the "man in the house rule" in welfare administration. (For 
an Australian case that might be similar see Re Waterford and Director General of Social 
Services, (1980) 3 Administrative Law Decisions 63. 
20. R.S.O. 1980, c. 484, s. 17. 
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In other ways too, judicial review is detrimental to the public interest. 
For example, it is common for a statute establishing a ne w area of law to be 
cast in the style of skeleton legislation. The expectation is that the admi-
nistering and adjudicating tribunal will recognize the statute as a skeleton 
structure, and that as the tribunal gains experience it will add the flesh and 
blood to produce a workable system21. That is the approach that an 
intelligent court will normally take when a statute establishes the court as the 
adjudicating tribunal. Yet when courts are reviewing the decisions of 
tribunals that they have labelled "inferior", they take a more restrictive 
approach, reading the statute not as a skeleton structure to be fleshed out by 
the tribunal, but as a perimeter confining the jurisdiction of the tribunal. 
Another major concern in relation to tribunals that have a pyramid 
structure is that judicial review can tend to undermine rather than enhance 
the quality of primary adjudication. For example in social insurance and 
social security systems, there is often political pressure to constrain the 
aggregate payout. This pressure can filter through the system to emerge in 
irresponsible, curt and negative decisions reached without adequate inquiry. 
Those who complain and persist, and their legal or political representatives, 
can be placated by having a proper inquiry conducted in the appeal system. 
In this way, the administering agency can accommodate the political 
pressures both ways. Because judicial review only comes into play, if at all, 
after the final level of appeal within the system, it tends to entrench rather 
than dismantle that practice, and hence tends to increase, rather than reduce, 
the overall incidence of injustice. 
Judicial review, and particularly the assault on privative clauses, has 
probably had a negative influence on primary adjudication in another way 
too. I think, for example, of the decisions of welfare administrators, pensions 
adjudicators, and tax officials. The courts have labelled these decisions as 
"administrative", and that characterization has generally been accepted in 
the public service. Public expectations as well as expectations within the 
public service would surely be different if the decisions made at the primary 
level of adjudication were perceived as "judicial". That term, however, is 
reserved for decisions made by those in more exhalted positions. Thus 
judicial review has tended to discourage, rather than encourage, the deve-
lopment of a judicial posture at the level of adjudication at which it could 
have the greatest utility. 
Judicial review also encourages the perception of a tribunal, or the 
upper echelon of a tribunal, as the lower level of a judicial hierarchy. This 
can be a negative influence on the hiring of tribunal members. For example, 
21. See e.g., Decision No. 134, (1975) 2 Workers' Compensation Reporter 137, p. 138. 
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it may be important to the efficacy of a statutory system that a board 
chairman should have a mixture of executive, judicial and legislative roles, 
which would probably include policy planning, co-ordination and imple-
mentation. The demands of that position may require a person of an 
intellectual calibre higher than that normally found among judicial appoint-
ments ; but it surely makes no sense to have appeals from a higher to a lesser 
intellect, particularly when the former also has the expertise in relation to the 
subject matter. Thus judicial review may well be a downward influence on 
the calibre of people willing to accept appointments to a tribunal which the 
courts have been allowed to label and treat as "inferior". 
A final concern is the significance of judicial review in the distribution 
of political power. When governments established a variety of adjudicating 
tribunals they decided, among other things, that judicial power should be 
more broadly distributed, that adjudicative decision-making should be more 
pluralistic. The goals, values and methods to be brought to bear in these 
adjudicative processes were to be drawn from broader sections of the 
community and not confined to those of a small legal elite. Judicial review 
tends to defeat that democratizing move by establishing a pyramid structure 
with judges in courts of general jurisdiction at the apex. 
2. Explanations for judicial review 
The expansion of judicial review cannot be explained or justified by the 
reasons given in the advocacy in support of it. At least since Lord Hewart 
wrote The New Despotism22, much of that advocacy has consisted of 
emotional rhetoric, claiming that, for example, "[...] the power of judicial 
review constitutes the last bulwark of the citizen against the arbitrary 
decisions of the state"23. Such rhetoric might pass muster on ceremonial 
occasions or in after-dinner speeches, but it cannot withstand serious 
reflection in the light of day. 
The main problem with such claims is that they misrepresent the 
distribution of power in society. Such claims have created a conventional 
wisdom in relation to judicial review that bureaucrats wield power, and that 
they seek to expand that power. The reality is that power rests predominantly 
outside the public service, and predominantly in the corporate sector. 
Judicial review does little to restrain the abuse of that power. Indeed, it 
ranks among the negative influences that restrain government departments 
and tribunals from controlling the exercise of corporate power. 
22. New York, Cosmopolitan Book Corp., 1929. 
23. J. DESCHENES, The Sword and The Scales, Toronto, Butterworths, 1979, p. 29. 
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In any political society, one would expect that if allegations of excessive 
power are being made by people in establishment institutions, those 
allegations would be levied not against those who wield the power that 
controls that society, but against those whose accrual of some degree of 
power is perceived as threatening. It may be partly for this reason that many 
judges have seen the civil service and tribunals as a threat to be controlled. 
Thus judicial cries for the judicial protection of the citizen against the state 
may be no more than special pleading for the power and privilege of judicial 
law-making and its supremacy over the democratic process. The decisions of 
legislatures to confer upon tribunals a range of remedies and sanctions that 
were not bestowed upon the courts may have been another factor contri-
buting to jurisdictional jealousy. 
Much of the enthusiasm for judicial review has rested upon a respect for 
the "rule of law", and yet that concept has surely been undermined more 
than it has been enhanced by judicial review. It has been undermined 
primarily by being narrowed. "Law" has been defined as "ordinary law", 
which has been defined as the law created or applied by courts of general 
jurisdiction24. Thus instead of being perceived as applying to all tribunals 
and departments of government, the "rule of law" was defined in a way that 
would justify a judicial power grab. The resulting judicial message to 
tribunals and departmental decision-makers is that the "rule of law" is not 
relevant to their own law-making responsibilities. It is hardly surprising that, 
despite decades of judicial review, many public officials, including tribunal 
members, perceive of the statutes which have created their tribunals or 
departments and which have conferred their powers as a form of decorative 
literature rather than as a body of law to be implemented. 
The assertion that only courts can determine "law" is a notion born of 
wizardry and power politics, not of any rational analysis of public need, or 
of any choice made in the democratic process. It reflects an attempted 
ideological rationalization for judicial review that is oriented in private law, 
not in public law. It perceives of a legal system that is an authoritarian 
pyramid structure with the appellate courts as the apex. A more democratic 
perception of the nature of law might well see legislatures as the apex with 
courts and other adjudicating tribunals functioning in parallel with each 
other, exercising the authority that the legislature has delegated to them, and 
acting in relationships of superiority to each other only when the legislature 
has so determined. 
24. For example, this theme runs through The New Despotism, supra, note 22. 
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An alternative assertion is that judicial review is needed to prevent 
tribunals from abusing their powers or otherwise behaving in irresponsible 
ways. One difficulty with that assertion is that the remedy is unrelated to the 
scope of the problem. The neglect of power and the failure to act are seldom 
controlled by judicial review, and where the abuse of power exists, it may be 
systematic. Hence it may require a system-oriented response and one that 
does not depend upon private action for its initiation. Moreover, the history 
of administrative law has probably seen more abuse of power by the 
judiciary than by the tribunals. Indeed, the ultimate affront to the democratic 
process is surely the judicial decisions that have over-ridden or ignored the 
privative clauses. With judicial review, the risk of arbitrary or irresponsible 
conduct on the part of those who are more or less answerable to parliament 
is replaced by the risk of arbitrary or irresponsible conduct on the part of 
those who are virtually immune from any form of democratic scrutiny. 
The expansion of judicial review can only be explained by looking 
beyond the ostensible reasons. One factor has been the power and influence 
of the legal profession, promoting a reverence for courts as decision-making 
institutions. One of my colleagues has described this influence as "[...] largely 
stimulated by self-interest and rooted in an ideology of self-importance"25. 
While that unkind phrase may be harsh, there is no doubt that the legal 
profession has tended to elevate courts of general jurisdiction and to 
disparage other tribunals, though the profession has been more divided and 
more accepting of a tribunal if it is one in relation to which a specialist bar 
has developed. 
Another factor supporting judicial review has been that the source 
material for the literature on the subject creates an over-estimate of its 
achievements. Part of the blame lies with the case method of legal education 
and with the production of textbooks by using the law reports as primary 
source material. The cases most commonly used in legal education and legal 
literature are not representative. They include a disproportionate number in 
which the decision of a tribunal, minister or department was disturbed by the 
court on review. Nor are they written by an impartial observer. For example, 
one would expect the interaction between a court and a tribunal to be 
described differently if the reported account had been written by a tribunal 
member. Perhaps most important, the law reports tell us little or nothing 
about the real impact of judicial review. Commonly they do not include even 
the end result in the particular case. 
25. Voir supra, note 7, p. 164. 
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In some subject areas, the decisions on judicial review have been 
counter-productive partly because the value orientation of the judiciary has 
been different from that of the tribunal and partly because the intellectual 
quality of the court decisions has been inferior to those of the tribunal. An 
example is the decisions relating to the Labour Relations Board in Ontario, 
and in some other provinces. 
There are other subject areas in which the intellectual quality of the 
court decisions has commonly exceeded that of the tribunal decisions, but 
even in those subject areas, the overall impact of judicial review is still 
probably negative. For example, in cases where the decision of a workers' 
compensation board has been disturbed by a court on appeal or review, it is 
my impression that for the most part, the board was obviously wrong and 
the court obviously right. Part of the explanation is that in workers' 
compensation, as in other systems of social insurance and social security, the 
incidence of political power in the legislative process differs from what it is in 
subsequent administration and adjudication. The result is that the admi-
nistering and adjudicating department or tribunal is under constant pressure 
not to fulfil the terms of the Act. Judicial review can serve a purpose here, 
and indeed, a few examples can be found to support the assertion that 
judicial review operates to protect the citizen against bureaucracy. Despite 
this assessment, I would see judicial review as counter-productive even in 
this subject area, and for these reasons. 
1. The disturbance of a board decision by a court does not always 
indicate the result in the case. Often the court decides simply that the 
board reached its conclusion by the wrong criteria. It may then be 
open to the board to reach the same conclusion by other criteria; 
and if it does, the results may well have included a substantial waste 
of public and private funds, additional frustration for the claimant, 
and a delay in rehabilitation (sometimes with permanent damage to 
rehabilitation prospects). 
2. For every case in which a court has disturbed a board decision, there 
were probably twenty other applications for judicial review in which 
it declined to do so. Those court decisions will have taken months or 
years, sometimes with damaging delays in the commencement of 
rehabilitation. Moreover, the protraction of a litigious atmosphere 
and the consequential increases in the number of professionals 
interacting with the claimant can be causes of therapeutic harm26. 
26. See e.g., T.G. ISON, "The Therapeutic Significance of Compensation Structures", forth-
coming in the University of Toronto Law Journal. 
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Also substantial amounts of private and public funds will have been 
spent on an unproductive process. 
3. For each case in which a court has disturbed a board decision, there 
were probably a hundred or more other board decisions that were 
just as wrong, but which were not corrected because of the variety of 
factors that can deter or divert a claimant from seeking judicial 
review. If there is to be a system of outside intervention to prevent 
injustice by a workers' compensation board, it should not be a 
process that involves damaging delays, and which even at its best 
only provides unequal justice by greasing a few squeaky wheels. Any 
outside intervention should be by way of systematic supervision that 
includes spot checking on the primary level of adjudication to ensure 
consistency and to ensure that the response to systematic injustice is 
a systematic remedy. 
Similar concerns arise in relation to social security. The decision of a 
particular case on judicial review may result in a welfare recipient receiving 
the benefits to which she was entitled, but what is the aggregate effect ? 
The appeal to ordinary law does not add a penny to the total welfare budget, 
but it may divert some part ofthat limited budget from the benefits account to 
administration and litigation.27 
3. The realities of power 
Underlying the widespread expansion of judicial review has been a 
mythology that misrepresents the incidence and use of political power. The 
target has been the public servant, "the departmental despot" whose 
unbridled power requires that his encroachments upon our human rights 
and civil liberties must be constrained by judicial review. 
The reality, of course, is that few public servants ever rise above the 
mid-range in the power structure. The power of some public servants is 
significant in relation to the under-privileged but is still slight in relation to 
those who really wield power. 
To a large extent, power lies in the hands of those who control a few 
multi-national conglomerate oligopolies. This corporate power in relation to 
the political process and public administration is assured by the scale of 
modern production, finance, and marketing, creating as it does an inevitable 
27. Voir supra, note 7, p. 200. 
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coincidence between economic and political power. This corporate power is 
nurtured and exercised through the financial and other support of political 
parties, professional peer group affiliations and job interchanges, the control 
of much economic information in the corporate sector, the continuous 
monitoring of government action, control of the media through ownership 
and advertising, the establishment of satellite "research" institutions, the 
control of boards of governors of public institutions (including universities), 
and other social, recreational and residential connections that contribute to 
the dynamics of elite accommodation2 8 . 
A significant incident of the power is the threat to withdraw, or not to 
provide, something that only the corporate world is portrayed as able to 
furnish. For example, proposals for government action are supported or 
resisted by reference to the need to attract foreign capital, or to retain 
domestic capital. 
[...] business and its representatives are part of a high level, interactive 
business-government-civil service network that is not duplicated in the same 
way for any other interest group in society.29 
Even at the high points of public disapproval of corporate conduct, the 
political clout of business has always kept really threatening intervention 
outside the realm of practical politics 30. 
Perhaps what is most crucial is not so much the power to control the 
outcome of decisions as the power to determine the agenda ; the power to 
determine what issues are debateable. "Definition of the alternatives is the 
choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power" 31. For this 
reason, the incidence of political power cannot be measured by counting the 
winners and losers in the outcomes of public controversies. 
Influence on governmental decisions is only a part, and perhaps the 
lesser part, of corporate power. Even more important is the power of 
independent action. 
[...] the largest corporations [...] are political systems that exercise power 
within spheres that extend far beyond their ostensible functions of efficient 
producers of goods and providers of services. Notwithstanding the rise of 
manifold regulation and the alleged play of pluralist, countervailing forces, the 
28. See e.g., R. PRESTHUS, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, Cambridge U.P., 1973. 
29. S. M. BFCK, Corporate Power and Public Policy, Lecture delivered at Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University, Toronto, April 1985, p. 35. 
30. E. S. HERMAN, Corporate Control, Corporate Power, Cambridge U.P., 1981, p. 296. 
31. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, The Semi-Sovereign People, Holt, Rinehart, 1960, p. 68. 
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large corporation wields power of a governmental kind that commands, directs 
and influences large segments of society.32 
and 
[...] those citizens attempting, individually or collectively, to protect themselves 
from the impacts of corporate policy on their life and health are consistently 
forced to play against a stacked deck.33 
The power is exercised too by the infiltration of other organizations. 
Even in faculties of law, for example, we have seen the offer to law faculty 
members of free indoctrination programs in attractive resort areas aimed at 
resurrecting 19th century market theory under the guise of "law and 
economics". When commercial activity is clearly operating against the 
public interest, this is labelled as "market failure", as if it were some 
exceptional and unexpected deviation from the blissful state that should 
result naturally from unrestricted corporate activity. 
The multi-national conglomerates, with satellites of professional firms 
in support roles, constitute gigantic organizations. Organization is (among 
other things) the mobilization of bias,34 and massive organization is the 
mobilization of bias on a massive scale. 
Of course corporate interests coincide to a large extent with public 
interests. Even where they conflict, examples can be found of a corporation 
compromising its own interests to accommodate public policy objectives. 
Also of course multi-national conglomerates often play the role of "good 
corporate citizens" in other ways, particularly by charitable contributions 
and by patronage of the arts. The hard reality remains, however, that there is 
to a large extent a structural, natural and inevitable conflict between 
corporate goals and the public interest. This conflict emerges in relation to 
such matters as pollution, occupational health, subsidies from tax-payers 
money to corporations, and other ways of externalizing cost. Perhaps above 
all, the conflict relates to the definition of the gross national product. 
It is surely this power structure that explains why the Great Lakes have 
become the toxic cesspools of North America, why deregulation and reduced 
enforcement are perceived as progress in relation to occupational health, 
why the solution to unemployment is perceived as more jobs, and why the 
solution to the arms race is perceived to lie in more genocidal weapons. It is 
surely this power structure that explains too why species of animals that have 
32. Supra, note 29, p. 3. 
33. T. F. SCHRECKER, Political Economy of Environmental Hazards, Law Reform Commission 
of Canada, 1984, p. 78. 
34. Supra, note 31, p. 71. 
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inhabited the earth for millions of years are being extinguished by corporate 
activity, why buildings that have stood as monuments for centuries are being 
destroyed by acid rain, and why in Europe even the Black Forest is 
disappearing. It is surely this power structure that also explains why 
primitive peoples who have lived in harmony with nature for generations are 
now being trained to pollute and destroy. It is this power structure that helps 
to explain too the expansion of judicial review. 
Of course any political society must seek to balance and resolve 
conflicting private and public interests, but it is surely inherent in democracy 
that this resolution should be achieved through the electoral process. A 
major problem with judicial review is that after the balance has been struck 
by the legislature, it may then be shifted, by those who are not answerable to 
the electorate, in favour of corporate interests. Many examples have been 
seen in the area of labour law. Our labour relations legislation proclaims as a 
matter of public policy the promotion of collective bargaining among 
employees 35, and that policy is generally pursued by labour relations boards. 
Yet when issues such as picketing at shopping centres or secondary picketing 
are considered by courts of general jurisdiction on judicial review or in other 
ways, there is a propensity to prefer private interests over the public policy 
proclaimed by the legislature, and the courts have been willing to override or 
ignore privative clauses to protect those interests. Thus the charisma of 
judicial review that stems from the elevation of courts and the disparagement 
of administrative tribunals becomes another device for preferring corporate 
interests over the democratically proclaimed public policy. 
The realities of political power do not have, and perhaps never did have, 
much in common with the perceptions of power that inspired the expansion 
of judicial review. The burgeoning of tribunals was seen as threatening. It 
threatened the corporate sector with restraints upon the corporate role in 
economic and political planning as well as with other interventions that 
might allow the democratic process to curtail their activities. It threatened 
the bench by the establishment of rival jurisdictions ; and it threatened the 
legal profession by creating tribunals in which expertise in the adversary 
process might not place the profession at an advantage. 
Judicial review has done little or nothing to protect the citizen against 
those who wield power. For example, after several decades of judicial review, 
one of our leading scholars in the area of environmental law has written that 
[...] there are few clearly established rights to participate in environmental 
decisions available to Canadian citizens. To the extent that citizens are 
35. For example, Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 228, preamble. 
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permitted opportunities for participation, these are narrow, formal, and largely 
ineffective.36 
Corporate power is relevant to judicial review in several ways. First, as 
mentioned above, judicial review and other uses of courts have a constraining 
influence on regulatory processes. Secondly, judicial review tends to shift the 
balance that has been struck by the legislature between corporate and public 
interests by moving it in favour of the former. Thirdly, and perhaps most 
importantly, the ongoing exercise of corporate power requires the submission 
of governments to the dominance of corporate interests, and the acquiescence 
of other elites in that submission is more readily secured if governments also 
accommodate the interests of the professions, including the interests of the 
bench and bar in judicial review. 
These political realities may help to explain why the expansion of 
judicial review has not taken place in response to any situation by situation 
or item by item evaluation of its significances and consequences, but rather 
by broad assertions of its inevitable value. These political realities also help 
to explain, to a large extent, the impotence of judicial review as a protection 
of the public interest and even as a remedy for the aggrieved citizen against 
the state. If we consider, for example, systems of social insurance and social 
security, the power structure operates on the aggregate, not selectively 
against individual claims. Of course judicial review might occasionally tip 
the balance in favour of a claimant in a particular case, and for that 
individual, might be beneficial ; but its overall impact on the system will have 
been to provide the occasional palliative rather than a systematic remedy 
large enough to strike the full scope of the injustice. 
4. The Charter of Rights 
The ultimate step was taken when the government of Canada, without 
taking any plebiscite of the people, created a new constitution for Canada, 
including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms11. In 1982, this was 
enacted by the Parliament at Westminster in its last gasp as the Imperial 
Parliament in relation to Canada. The Charter expanded judicial review in 
relation to legislation, as well as executive action. 
Until this point, the validity of legislation could rarely be challenged 
except by reference to the distribution of powers between the national and 
provincial governments. Now the affliction of federalism is compounded by 
36. Supra, note 10, p. 74. 
37. Supra, note 3. 
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a constitutional charter that enables legislation to be challenged on a broad 
range of grounds, such as freedom of religion or expression, mobility rights, 
rights to life, liberty and security of the person, rights to retain counsel, 
equality rights, language rights, etc. 
The substantive "rights" which were "guaranteed" by the Charter were 
so manifestly laudable that any questioning of the real significance of the 
document may have seemed, and may still seem, both irreverent and 
irrelevant. 
The ostensible entrenchment of these civil liberties was part of a 
package that included the introduction of a constitutional amending formula 
and the further entrenchment of language rights. The package involved a 
complicated political manoeuvre which had as one of its objectives the 
diminution of Quebec separatism and the political consolidation of Quebec 
in Canada. 
The result is a calamity. Almost all of the objections to judicial review 
mentioned above apply to the Charter, but their significance is greater in this 
context, and more objections must be added. 
The Charter entrenches the right to vote, and yet nothing this century 
has subverted that right more than the Charter itself. The sovereignty of 
Parliament, once perceived as the essence of democracy 38, is now replaced 
by the sovereignty of the judiciary, and the right to vote is now a right to vote 
only for the membership of subordinate institutions. The policy making 
tribunal which now stands at the apex of governmental power is neither 
elected nor representative. Its membership consists of appointed officials, 
predominantly male, predominantly drawn from the same generation, and 
all drawn from the same profession. 
Unfortunately, the right to vote has been undermined not only by the 
Charter but by other developments. First, its significance has been eroded by 
technological "progress" of enormous magnitude. The development choices 
confronting society have become so obscure in their far-reaching and 
permeating consequences that they are no longer visible as choices confront-
ing the electorate at all. Thus technological changes, such as jet travel, 
nuclear power and the advances in micro-computer mechanisms, have not 
resulted from any choice of the electorate, nor usually from any known 
choice of elected officials. Yet they shape the environment and the nature of 
38. The Chief Justice of Canada is reported as having contended that the doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty never applied in any event to commonwealth countries outside 
the U.K., "Justice Dickson Casts New Light on Parliamentary Supremacy", (1985) 5 
Ontario Lawyers Weekly No. 13, p. 1. That contention, however, adds to the concern. 
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the society in which we live. Meanwhile, the role that political parties might 
have played in the formation of policy has been replaced by campaign 
imagery, brokerage politics and the dynamics of elite accommodation. 
Secondly, the democratic dimension of government has been threatened 
by the recent adoption of value for money audits and the associated demand 
for program evaluation39. With regard to many government programs, it is 
close to impossible to develop the research techniques for ascertaining their 
consequences, let alone attaching any value to them. The demand for 
periodic program evaluation coupled with the lack of any scientific method 
of measurement is likely to mean that, in practice: 
(a) With some exceptions, particularly in relation to the military, a 
structural bias is established against any policy the success of which 
cannot be demonstrated in dollar amounts or other numerical units ; 
(b) Interest groups with ongoing political influence in relation to 
administration will tend to have even greater power compared with 
more dissipated groups that only represent the public interest and 
that can only muster the resources for more episodic political action ; 
(c) Yet another vehicle is established through which the value judgments 
and political influence of a small elite, closely associated with 
corporate interests, can masquerade as professional output. 
These are the developments that, together with the Charter, really 
threaten the right to vote, but no protection from them will be found in the 
Charter. Constitutional entrenchment of the right to vote may have its 
aesthetic attractions, but it is a cruel illusion. 
There are two provisions of the Charter which might be seen as attempts 
to mitigate its anti-democratic nature. The first is a provision that the 
"rights" which are "guaranteed" by the Charter are not absolute ; they are 
subject "[...] to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demons-
trably justified in a free and democratic society"40. One might have thought 
that in a free and democratic society, the proper limits on corporate and 
personal rights should be those prescribed by the elected legislature without 
being subject to over-ruling by an appointed judge. The second provision is 
that, with regard to most sections of the Charter, there can be a legislative 
over-ride41. Where the legislature expressly declares that a statute shall 
39. See e.g., J. M. JORDAN et al., "Assessing the Results of Public Expenditure : Program 
Evaluation in the Canadian Federal Government", (1979) 22 Canadian Public Administration 
581; H.G. ROGERS et al., "Evaluation in Practice: the State of the Art in Canadian 
Governments", (1981) 24 Canadian Public Administration 371. 
40. Supra, note 3, a. 1. 
41. Ibid. 
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operate notwithstanding a provision included in the specified sections of the 
Charter, the statute is not limited by the Charter provisions. As a matter of 
practical politics, however, it is doubtful whether this legislative over-ride 
can be used outside of Quebec. It is particularly unlikely that it could be used 
in any bill that was opposed by a powerful interest having media support. 
Moreover, the legislative over-ride is subject to expiry in five years, though 
with the possibility of renewal every five years42. 
The Charter also undermines the franchise by allowing politicians to 
dump hot issues, such as abortion, pornography and Sunday closing, into 
the courts. The likely result is to make the political process even more bland, 
and to make elected representatives even less responsible. 
Another aspect of the right to vote which we have claimed distinguishes 
"the free world" from eastern block countries is the right of the electorate to 
switch from one political ideology to another. While that choice may already 
have gone as a matter of practical politics, it may now be gone as a matter of 
constitutional law. To a substantial but unmeasurable extent, the Charter 
entrenches a political posture. Consider, for example, what would happen if 
a government was elected that wanted to nationalize a major industry, say 
the banking system. The Charter, on its face, avoids the entrenchment of 
property rights, and that was a deliberate decision resulting from the 
compromises made in the parliamentary process. Yet it would take an 
incredible naivety to feel confident that the courts would not decide that 
such a nationalization statute is unconstitutional43. 
Unfortunately, the media coverage prior to the event did not include 
much analysis of the real significance of the Charter. It focussed on political 
controversy about particular rules rather than the significance of the 
aggregate. For example, women's organizations campaigned for the consti-
tutional entrenchment of sex equality and native organizations campaigned 
for the constitutional entrenchment of native rights. Except in Quebec (and 
perhaps Saskatchewan), no organization appeared to be campaigning for the 
constitutional entrenchment of nothing. The debate was usually presented in 
the media as if somehow the Charter would be a self-executing document. 
With some exceptions at low profile, there was little recognition in the media 
of the transfer of legislative power to the judiciary. Yet the terms of the 
42. Ibid. 
43. It is not impossible to find statements among some of the judiciary that saving us from 
socialism is one of the functions of judicial review. Supra, note 23. See also H. J. GLASBEEK 
et al., "The Legalisation of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms", (1984) 2 Socialist Studies 84. 
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Charter are so broad and general that now as a practical matter the validity 
of legislation and of executive action are matters of judicial discretion. 
Related to this is the increased technicalization of the debate of public 
policy issues, with consequential impairment of public participation. The 
technicalization of public policy decision-making is long standing. Indeed, it 
can be seen as a natural outcome of the Industrial Revolution, the emergence 
of the professions, and the Companies Acts. For example, in occupational 
and public health, the processes of risk assessment are rarely separated from 
the decisions on acceptable risk, and both are commonly perceived as 
technical. Even with regard to major developments, such as nuclear power, 
the risks associated with each alternative strategy were never identified and 
assessed in any publication that would have enabled a public preference to 
be expressed about which set of risks the public would rather take. Political 
questions involving serious value judgments are commonly decided by those 
with the technical knowledge as if they were purely technical questions. Even 
when government officials are involved in the decision-making, the mecha-
nization, electrification, automation and chemicalization of modern industry 
and commerce create complex structures in which the decisions of people in 
managerial, technical and professional positions translate into an output 
form that assumes the appearance of inevitable destiny. 
Here again, the Charter does more to aggravate than to mitigate the 
problems. Decisions under the Charter are perceived as "legal". They are 
not for the instinct of jurors but are made by judges assisted by "legal" 
advocacy. Not only does this tend to trivialize and technicalize the debate of 
public policy issues, but almost inevitably, the values espoused in the process 
will tend to be those of the clientele from which the legal profession derives 
most of its income. 
This last point can be illustrated by reference to the burden of proof in 
the control of toxic contamination. What position should a government take 
with regard to the release of potentially toxic substances into the air, into our 
water, or into our food? If the toxicity of a substance has never been tested 
by any means that would yield reliable conclusions in relation to human 
beings, should the substance be assumed safe and its use allowed until harm 
is demonstrable, or should it be assumed to be harmful and its use prohibited 
until its safety can be demonstrated? This question, which may involve how 
much risk should be taken in the pursuit of maximum consumption, is surely 
one for the elected branch of government, or at least for officials who are 
answerable to the elected branch of government. Where, however, an 
administering agency decides in favour of caution, it may run the risk of 
judicial reversal by a court which, in the exercise of its legislative power, 
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wants proof of harm as a justification for any government restraint on 
corporate enterprise44. 
Another way in which the Charter tends to enhance corporate power is, 
of course, the inequality of access to legal services. Even before the Charter, 
the President of the Canadian Federation of Independent Business said this : 
I began to see how the system is stacked in favour of those who own all the 
lawyers. I found out that the big corporations, without being conspiratorial, 
control the knowledge factory in this country [...]. It's a mandarin-to-mandarin 
process.45 
Here again, the Charter does more to aggravate than to mitigate the 
problem. Unrealistic suggestions are sometimes heard that equality of access 
might be achieved by the expansion of legal aid, but there is no prospect of 
that happening on any scale that would produce equality of access. 
Moreover, any moves towards it can add further to the enormous waste of 
public money resulting from the Charter. Inevitably, the multiplicity of 
forums for the debate of controversial political issues tends to increase the 
cost of participation in that debate, and thus enhances further the political 
power of those with the greater resources. 
Like the older type of judicial review under the prerogative writs, the 
Charter is counter-productive because it misrepresents the real incidence of 
political power. It seeks to protect civil liberties, but it rests on a false 
assumption about where the threats are coming from. On its face, the 
Charter would seem to constrain everyone. It provides that it applies to the 
Parliament and Government of Canada and to the legislatures and govern-
ments of the provinces. On ordinary principles of interpretation, that would 
be read in the same way as the traditional clause in a statute that "This Act 
binds the Crown". The interpretation that appears to be prevailing, however, 
is that the Charter only binds the legislatures and governments. On this view, 
the decisions of multi-national corporations are free from challenge. A 
judicial veto has been created over decisions reached through the democratic 
process, and over the decisions of those who exercise lesser degrees of power, 
but no comparable control has been created over those who function outside 
the democratic process and who exercise greater degrees of governmental 
power. The Charter is invoked to protect corporations against the elected 
44. In the United States, this attitude has emerged in cases on judicial review of regulation-
making. In Canada, it has emerged in the decisions on prosecutions. See e.g., R. v. Windsor 
Board of Health et ai, (1982) Canadian Employment Safety and Health Guide 95.046. 
45. Quoted in F. THOMPSON et ai. The Political Economy of Interest Groups in the Legislative 
Process in Canada, Montreal, Occasional Paper No. 9 for the Institute for Research on 
Public Policy, 1979, p. 48. 
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representatives of the people, but it does nothing to protect the people 
against the unilateral actions of corporations. In this way, too, it introduces 
another judicial structure for the further enhancement of corporate power. 
Fundamental rights essential to the democratic process, such as freedom 
of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association have now been 
formally enshrined in the Charter46, but at the same time they have been 
undermined by technological changes and economic concentration that have 
subjected the media of communication to the control of a tight oligopoly. 
Almost as a sick joke, the Charter provides for "freedom of the press 
and other media of communication"47, but the control and the censorship 
are not coming primarily from elected governments. The Charter does 
nothing to require the divestiture of ownership of the media by multi-
national conglomerates, nor does it even require a separation of the tie-in 
between advertising and news reporting. Moreover, if any government tried 
to provide for a genuinely free press, the legislation would be challenged as a 
violation of the Charter, and it would probably be declared invalid. 
Similarly, sex and age equality are more seriously threatened by the 
nature and the massive scale of technological change than by the decisions of 
elected representatives. The Charter does more to prevent than to promote 
the subjection of such changes to democratic scrutiny. At the more trivial 
level, the Charter protects our homes from the intrusion of meat inspectors48 
(who were never famous for their home visits anyway) while it does nothing 
to protect us from the daily invasion of hand bills and telephone advertising. 
In other ways too, the Charter operates to impair the democratic 
process and to enhance corporate power. There has been concern in Canada, 
as in other countries, about the enormous funds spent on election campaigns. 
A party, candidate, or supporters could swamp the media, gaining a 
substantial advantage over others with fewer resources. To provide for more 
equality of opportunity in seeking public office, Parliament passed a 
common type of statute to limit the amount that could be spent on election 
campaigns. That was challenged under the Charter and the court decided 
that a crucial provision of the statute is now unconstitutional as an 
encroachment upon freedom of speech49. 
46. Supra, note 3, a. 2. 
47. Ibid 
48. S. 20 of Bill C-27 (1985), which is an omnibus bill to bring federal statutes into accord with 
the Charter, amends the Meat Inspection Act to prohibit an inspector from entering a 
dwelling house without a warrant. 
49. National Citizens' Coalition Inc. et al. v. Attorney general of Canada, ( 1984) Alberta L.R. (2d) 
249. 
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It has been suggested, almost as a justification for the Charter, that the 
judges have exercised their new powers with restraint. Examples can be 
found either to support or to contradict that view. Even if one accepted the 
assertion at face value, the creation of a power to undermine the democratic 
process can hardly be justified because those exercising the power have used 
restraint. The same could be said about other branches of government, 
including the legislatures, tribunals and the executive that the judiciary is 
ostensibly protecting us against. If we are to place our faith in restraint in the 
exercise of paramount power, my preference would be not to place that faith 
in the one branch of government that is virtually immune from any kind of 
democratic recall. Administrative lawlessness, which was so much the 
concern of Lord Hewart, is subject to at least some controls by parliamentary 
scrutiny, the Auditor General, the Ombudsman, the media, and the scrutiny 
of interest groups, apart from judicial review. Judicial lawlessness is now 
controlled only by defining it out of existence. 
The transfer of power to the courts goes beyond the transfer of 
legislative power. It also disturbs in a haphazard way the role of the 
executive in deciding the priorities in public spending and the allocation of 
time in government agencies and departments. For example, if an interest 
group challenges a statute, this may require an immediate response with a 
substantial allocation of departmental resources, and hence the diversion of 
those resources from other matters that might be more crucial. 
A pervasive influence will be the allocation of disproportionate amounts 
to the resolution of those issues that attract the services of the legal 
profession, and a disproportionate amount to the profession itself. As with 
every other profession, there is a natural conflict between the legal profession 
and the public about how much of the professional service is optimum. 
There is a natural propensity for the profession to generate more refinement 
in the legal system, and hence to demand that the proportion of the gross 
national product allocated to legal services should exceed the proportion 
that, given a chance, the public might determine. The judicial assault on 
privative clauses and now the Charter have tended to entrench the judgment 
of the profession on that question. The public interest is always threatened 
when producer interests are allowed to generate the body of law that 
determines the demand for the product. 
Perhaps it may be of interest to consider more of what is happening in 
response to the Charter. Most of the court decisions declaring a violation of 
the Charter have been in criminal proceedings, commonly drug cases50, and 
50. For a review of early Charter cases in the area of criminal law, see M. L. FRIEDLAND, 
"Criminal Justice and the Charter", (1983) 13 Manitoba Law Journal 549. 
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the conclusions reached could have been reached just as well under the 
existing law. For example, many criminal proceedings have been declared 
unconstitutional because of unreasonable delay. The same conclusion could 
have been reached under Magna Carta. In other cases, evidence has been 
declared inadmissable under the Charter for having been illegally obtained. 
The same conclusion could have been reached by traditional case-law 
development. Many other cases relate to police practice. This could be 
regulated more effectively51 by a Bill of Rights passed in the form of an 
ordinary statute and providing a statutory code of police behaviour, together 
with enforcement mechanisms and sanctions. 
In other moves, inquisitorial proceedings and the powers of inspectorates 
are being questioned in the cause of "deregulation". This may accommodate 
producer interests, but it is threatening to those who like to breathe the air, 
to drink the water, or to eat food without carcinogenic additives. This threat 
was enhanced by a dictum in a recent decision in the Supreme Court of 
Canada to the effect that the Charter "[...] embodies through its reference to 
a free and democratic society the essential features of our constitution 
including the separation of powers, responsible government and the rule of 
law"52. If that dictum prevails, it is now questionable whether a demo-
cratically elected legislature has any power to protect the public interest by 
establishing a tribunal with a combination of executive, legislative and 
adjudicative responsibility. Perhaps the ultimate irony is that the separation 
of powers will have become a part of our constitutional law by the decision 
of a court in the exercise of its supreme legislative power. 
In other areas, the Charter, like earlier judicial review, has become one 
of the forces that hinder or restrain public officials in the pursuit of public 
policy objectives. One example relates to the carnage of death and mutilation 
that occurs on the highways, much of it as a result of drunken driving. The 
police sought to control this problem by breathalizer testing. The Supreme 
Court of Canada has now decided that the demand for a breath sample is a 
form of detention, and that therefore a motorist has a constitutional right to 
counsel and must be allowed the opportunity of consulting with a lawyer 
before being required to blow into the device. In the particular case " , the 
motorist was required to blow at a police station following an accident and 
suspicion of drunkeness, but it is not clear that any different principle applies 
when a motorist is required to blow at a roadside spot check. The reasons for 
51. Typically, the Charter decisions relating to the police still leave uncertainty about how they 
are expected to behave. 
52. Operation Dismantle Inc. et al. v. The Queen et ai, [1985] 1 S.CR. 441, p. 491. 
53. The Queen v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613. 
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judgment contain no discussion of the availability of lawyers at the times of 
day at which these events usually occur, or of whether a sample taken after 
consultation with a lawyer will be of any validity as an indicator of the 
alcohol content in the body at the time of driving, or of whether the 
reduction in the number of drivers who can be tested in this way with the 
available police resources will reduce the level of public safety. It is 
predictable that ordinary working people will continue to submit auto-
matically to a police demand for a sample while some business and 
professional people, accustomed to the services of lawyers, may demand 
their right to counsel. This result will have been achieved by a decision 
pursuant to a Charter which purports to guarantee, among other things, that 
every individual is equal before the law. 
Another case relates to the door-to-door selling rackets, such as those 
involving encyclopaedias, saucepans, vacuum cleaners and frozen food. The 
public has been subjected to a series of merchandising campaigns that 
involve salesmen calling at the home, using high pressure sales tactics, fraud, 
and other predatory practices. Nova Scotia, like other provinces, legislated 
to constrain these rackets by a licensing system. One concern was the way in 
which fly-by-night salesmen would sweep an area and then be out of the 
jurisdiction when disputes arose, or when complaints were made which 
might have led to criminal proceedings. As a response to that problem, the 
relevant regulation required that salesmen calling at the home must be 
residents of the province. The court declared the regulation unconstitutional 
as violating the right of any citizen to live and work in any province54. Here 
again, there was no impact analysis, and no discussion in the judgment of the 
likely impact of the decision, compared with the regulation, on the control of 
fraud or other predatory practices in marketing. Regardless of impact, the 
right of racketeers to cross provincial boundaries now has constitutional 
paramountcy over the protection of the public against fraud and other 
predatory practices. 
Another judicial move tending to frustrate the achievement of public 
policy objectives has been the evolving refusal of the courts to give effect to 
statutes creating strict liability offences. This became evident when the 
Supreme Court of Canada enacted a distinction between "strict liability" 
and "absolute liability". Statutes creating strict liability offences were to be 
presumed to allow a defence of reasonable care, and these offences were to 
be labelled "strict liability". Only if the legislature made it clear that no 
54. Basile v. Attorney General of Nova Scotia, (1984) 62 N.S.R. (2d) 410. With regard to the 
legal profession, however, the court decided that the control of misbehaviour justified some 
residence requirements. Black v. Law Society of Alberta, [1984] 6 W.W.R. 385. 
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defence of reasonable care was applicable would the court recognize the 
offence as one of strict liability, and it would then be labelled "absolute 
liability"55. With the Charter, that distinction is now going. Some courts 
have already interpreted the Charter as creating a constitutional prohibition 
of strict liability (labelled "absolute liability") offences56. 
By making intent or negligence an issue, the courts seem determined to 
make proceedings under regulatory legislation judgmental in every case, and 
hence to preclude the legislature from creating a deterrent that will apply 
automatically in response to structure or conduct. While this may mitigate 
harshness, those who are bearing the consequences and paying the costs of 
all this have already decided through the elected government that they prefer 
more arbitrariness, perhaps with consequential gains in pollution control, 
highway safety, and the prevention of predatory practices in marketing. It 
has been suggested that the courts might be willing to allow some exceptions, 
including pollution control57, but this seems doubtful58. Even if the courts 
did allow any exceptions, they would still be unlikely to impose significant 
sanctions without proof of fault or neglect. 
One problem is, of course, that with regard to offences in complex or 
multi-location industries, a prosecuting agency may never be able to rebut a 
defence of due diligence without replicating the technical and other know-
ledge of the industry. Hence the Charter decisions against strict liability may 
well be another factor giving immunity to large corporate enterprises from 
any effective regulation to constrain predatory practices59, the externalization 
of cost, or other negative impacts on the public interest60. 
It has sometimes been suggested that problems of this type may decline 
as the courts gain experience with the Charter and a new generation of 
lawyers introduces a more policy-oriented style of advocacy ; but that is 
unrealistic optimism. The political pressures operating upon the universities 
demand a curriculum that is "relevant", and in faculties of law, the 
contemporary pressure favours a "core curriculum" which emphasizes 
private law subjects, with reduced coverage of the subjects that raise public 
policy issues affecting the interests of broader sections of the population. 
55. The Queen v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299. 
56. E.g.,/?. v. Westfair Foods Ltd. A1985) 38 Saskatchewan Reports 12;Ä. v. Watch, (1983) 24 
M.V.R. 224. 
57. Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, (1983) 4 CCC (3d) 243, p. 250. 
58. The primary case in which the Supreme Court of Canada undermined strict liability was a 
pollution case; supra, note 55. 
59. See e.g., T. G. ISON, Credit Marketing and Consumer Protection, London, Croom Helm, 
1979, p. 374 à 376. 
60. See e.g., Decision No. 167, (1975) 2 Workers' Compensation Reporter (B.C.) 234, p. 251 à 259. 
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These negative impacts of the Charter have not been counter-balanced 
by major achievements. Much of the statutory revision work following the 
Charter has been a process of dotting the i's and crossing the t's. The number 
of male pronouns in the statutes has been reduced, but that was already 
happening in response to the women's movement. 
Of course some decisions under the Charter might be seen as a success 
for human rights. For example, a statutory restraint on collective bargaining 
was declared unconstitutional61. My point, however, is not to deny that some 
decisions are made in favour of human rights. It is that when looking at the 
total picture, any favourable outcomes are nothing like enough to justify the 
damage. 
Other cases in which constitutional rights have been protected are not 
impressive. For example, as part of the change to metric measures, a 
regulation prohibited the advertising of gasoline (petrol) in other than metric 
units. This was declared void as a violation of freedom of expression61. 
There are surely other sufferings of humanity on which the tax-payers money 
could have been spent with greater achievement. Decisions or challenges of 
this type, which are an inevitable concomitant of the Charter, add to the 
concern that it becomes a diversion from rather than a protection of 
fundamental human rights. 
In the majority of cases in which Charter issues are raised, the courts 
conclude that there has been no violation ; but even these cases are not 
innocuous. Notice of challenges under the Charter must be given to 
Ministries of the Attorneys-General so that often two government depart-
ments or agencies are involved in the case, and sometimes the governments 
of other provinces and the federal government are involved. The allocation 
of tax-payers money to the process can be substantial, and with no 
achievement. At the same time, governments proclaim that they lack the 
resources to provide adequate income or services for the disabled and other 
needy sections of the population. Moreover, because of the allocation of 
departmental resources that may be required to rebut a challenge under the 
Charter, officials may sometimes feel constrained from taking action in 
pursuit of public policy objectives, particularly when the threat of Charter 
litigation comes from a powerful group that is applying other political 
pressures. 
Constitutional entrenchment can create other problems for policy 
planning. Where a constitutional challenge is predictable, the implementation 
61. Re Service Employees' International Union and Broadway Manor et ai, (1983) 4 D.L.R. (4th) 
231. 
62. R. v. Halpert el ai, (1983) 9 CCC (3d) 411. 
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of a new policy may require affirmation from both the legislature and the 
courts, but there is a problem of order. A current example in Ontario is a 
government policy to extend public funding to all years in the Catholic 
Separate Schools. For the government to go to the courts first would be 
difficult because there would be no statute that has been debated, amended 
and passed in the legislature on which the courts could adjudicate. If the 
government legislates first and implements the funding, there is an obvious 
risk of widespread dislocation in respect of teachers, students and school 
buildings if the courts should eventually decide that the legislation is 
unconstitutional. Even that decision might still leave doubt about what 
alternatives would be valid. If the government legislates first and then goes 
to the courts before implementation, there could be years of delay that 
would be incompatible with the government's political and legislative 
timetables. 
The ex-post facto approach in judicial decision-making, coupled with 
the pressures which favour judicial discretion over fixed rules, can make it 
very difficult for governments and others to engage in long-term policy 
planning. Moreover, Charter litigation can involve an enormous diversion of 
resources to multiple proceedings. Political battles that have been fought at 
substantial expense to the tax-payer in and around the cabinet and the 
legislature may have to be fought again, at further expense to the tax-payer, 
in and around the courts. 
An example can be seen in the administration of medical care. Some 
years ago, systems of government medical insurance were introduced 
through federal/provincial co-operation. The same insurance coverage was 
applied to individuals at all levels of income so that everyone could receive a 
good standard of medical care. In recent years, that provision has been 
undermined by the medical profession engaging in the "extra-billing" of 
patients. The predictable result of that practice is the re-introduction of a 
double standard of medical care. Also, those at lower levels of income 
subsidize higher standards of medical care for those at higher income levels. 
To avoid these negative consequences, the Federal Government legis-
lated against the practice of extra-billing. Predictably, the Canadian Medical 
Association has now launched an action claiming that the legislation is 
unconstitutional, and the claim includes an allegation that the statute 
violates the Charter. It is no surprise to find the responsible Minister quoted 
as saying that : 
[...] he is disappointed by the CMA's action because it reopens issues that were 
supposedly put to rest with the act's passage and could detract from efforts to 
get on with important issues in the health care system.63 
63. "CMA Challenges Extra-billing Law", Globe and Mail, Toronto, 18 July 1985, p. 1. 
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This is also another example of the Charter being used not to protect the 
weak from the strong. It is again being used by a powerful vested interest 
which, having lost in the legislature, now seeks another chance to defeat the 
democratic process. Of course the CM. A. may lose in the Supreme Court, 
but that could be in three years time. Meanwhile, the people will be suffering 
the health care consequences, vast sums of money will be spent on the 
Charter litigation, and the government will be under greater pressure to 
compromise with the vested interests, if only so that it can get on with other 
matters. 
Another consequence of the Charter is the propensity to trivialize the 
discussion of public policy issues. Because of the limited capacity of the 
courts to engage in any systematic analysis of the social impact of legislative 
options, the judicialization of public policy decision-making leads to results 
that rest upon an incredibly superficial foundation. It is probably only the 
incidence of political power and the pageantry and mysticism of legal 
process that enable us to get away with it. Examples of this trivialization can 
be seen in the cases mentioned above relating to election campaign expendi-
tures, itinerent selling, and breathalizer testing. 
Another example of the trivialization likely to arise in the near future 
relates to mandatory retirement. Various people and interest groups are 
launching court challenges under the Charter claiming that mandatory 
retirement is a form of age discrimination. Some of those who want to 
continue working beyond the present retirement age apparently believe that 
the abolition of mandatory retirement would result in people having a 
choice. That view, however, ignores any rational analysis of the likely 
consequences. A right to continue working beyond the present retirement 
age could well reduce the pressure to maintain retirement pensions, so that in 
practice, a right to continue working is likely to become a loss of the right to 
retire. Another predictable result of any right to continue working would be 
an increase in medical examinations and the dismissal of people whose work 
output is declining, many of whom would be below the current retirement 
age. There are a range of other likely consequences that would be and have 
been discussed in debate on the political scene. It is surely incredible that 
such a question should be decided by a court whose traditional modus 
operandi does not include that same breadth of debate, that is unrepresenta-
tive and consists exclusively of lawyers, that is without the resources for 
impact analysis64, and that receives only a limited range of inputs. It is even 
64. The judges mal well recognize impact analysis as relevant. See e.g., Wilson, J. in The Queen 
v. Big M Drug Marl, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. But it is difficult to see how this can be undertaken 
efficiently in the context of adjudication on an adversary model. 
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more questionable when the judges may have personal interests in the 
outcome. 
This trivialization of policy making extends beyond court decisions. 
Consideration of the Charter is perceived as a "legal" matter, and thus one 
for the Ministries of the Attorneys-General. This tends to increase the 
powers of those ministries in relation to the line departments and agencies of 
government which would usually have a clearer perception of public policy 
objectives. Perhaps for this reason, trivialization has characterized the 
omnibus amending bills that have been introduced to bring the statutes into 
accord with the Charter. 
The results can be illustrated with regard to sex equality. If one believes 
in sex equality, what is important is equality in end result, not equality on the 
face of a statute. It is axiomatic that equal justice will never be achieved by 
treating everyone alike. When the matter is perceived as one for the Ministry 
of the Attorney-General, however, the predictable result is the pursuit of sex 
equality on the face of the statutes regardless of the consequences. Thus the 
reviews of existing statutes that have taken place appear to have been done 
by scrutinizing the language of the acts, without impact analysis. 
An example can be seen in the benefits payable in fatal cases under the 
Workers' Compensation Act of British Columbia. They were revised in 
197465 with a primary goal being sex equality. An impact analysis of the 
options was undertaken having regard to social and economic circumstances, 
and the options considered included sex equality on the face of the statute. It 
was then decided that sex equality could best be advanced by discriminating 
in the statute in favour of older women. Now, in response to the Charter, an 
omnibus bill is going through the legislature amending various provincial 
statutes to bring them into accord with what government lawyers apparently 
believe to be its requirements66. Predictably, the fatal benefits payable under 
the Workers' Compensation Act are now being amended to provide for sex 
equality on the face of the statute regardless of how much inequality that 
produces in result. 
The trivialization of debate is aggravated by the problems of classifica-
tion generated by the Charter and which can only be resolved in arbitrary 
ways. Consider, for example, legislation requiring that shops and businesses 
be closed on Sundays. Predictably, this was challenged as an infringement 
upon freedom of religion67 ; and yet that can hardly be discussed as if it were 
65. Workmen's Compensation Amendment Act, 1974, s. 14. 
66. Charter of Rights Amendments Bill, 1985, s. 121.Section 122 contains other provisions likely 
to result in sex inequality, and to the disadvantage of women. 
67. In the event, the court decided that the Lord's Day Act, which provided for Sunday closing, 
was invalid. The Queen v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. 
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entirely separate from the regulation of labour relations, competition policy, 
public health, the promotion of family life, and perhaps even environmental 
control. Under the Charter, however, certain rights are paramount, and if a 
court finds any way to accommodate a submission that the infringement of a 
paramount right is less harmful than the alternative of damage to other 
interests, it is duplicating the legislative function of political judgment. 
To raise questions in Canada now of the kind mentioned here would 
seem only like a gratuitous lament. Charter ligitation is a growth industry 
which has already spawned its satellite industries. Together they engage a 
preponderance of the "experts" in the subject area and they constitute 
powerful interest groups supporting the perpetuation of the Charter. The 
repeal of the Charter is virtually impossible, and outside the ranks of charter 
enthusiasts, the prevailing mood seems to be one of cognitive dissonance. 
The Charter is in place, we must learn to live with it, and perhaps we should 
try to like it. 
5. The need for extended use of the judicial process 
The arguments raised above against judicial review are a re-assertion of 
the case for democracy and legislative sovereignty. They are arguments 
against placing the judiciary at the apex of public policy decision-making ; 
but they are not arguments against greater use of the judicial process. 
Paradoxically, one of the consequences of judicial review has probably been 
the under-use of the judicial process in situations where its use would have 
been constructive. 
First, there are many areas in which the traditional judicial process of 
fact finding and applying law to facts could well be expanded. I think in 
particular of those adjudicating tribunals and agencies which already have a 
pyramid structure, particularly those engaged in the re-distribution of 
money, such as the income tax system, and the social insurance and the 
social security systems. Primary adjudication in these systems is often 
appalling. A decision is made by an adjudicator or other official, commonly 
without notice of the issues or any opportunity to be heard, and without any 
other form of adequate inquiry. If an aggrieved citizen wants to appeal, the 
matter is first referred to a review process within or closely associated with 
the initial decision-making unit. A predictable consequence is a serious 
downward influence on the quality of primary adjudication. This structure 
facilitates the appointment of clerical grade personnel as initial decision-
makers, with review officers being selected for the thinking role. The need, 
however, is for thinking prior to initial adjudication, not upon a review. 
Bearing in mind that the majority of citizens probably accept even negative 
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decisions of government departments and agencies without challenge, this 
type of review structure tends to promote sloppy decision-making at first 
instance, which then becomes tolerated by greasing the squeaky wheels. 
Moreover, notification to a claimant of the decision following a review can 
become, in practice, a form of discouragement from proceeding with an 
appeal68. 
If judicial review applies to these situations, it only applies following a 
decision at the top of the pyramid within the system ; but injustice is less 
likely to be found among those few cases that reach the top of the pyramid 
than it is among the vast number in which the people have acquiesced in 
negative initial decisions. It is at the primary and first appeal levels that the 
judicial process is needed. In many of these systems, there should be 
provision for prompt and immediate appeal from the initial decision to a 
tribunal operating on a judicial model, and also spot checking of initial 
adjudication by that tribunal as a form of quality control. 
As mentioned above, the current structure of judicial review is also 
negative in its impact by encouraging the perception of primary adjudication 
as "administrative". This tends to excuse those engaged in this process from 
proceeding in a judicial manner. What is needed here is not the adversary 
system, but an inquisitorial system which, in addition to enquiries initiated 
by the adjudicator, includes certain attributes of the judicial process, such as 
providing an opportunity to be heard, keeping an open mind until all the 
evidence is in, articulation of the issues, recognition of the applicable 
criteria, and reasons for decisions. 
Secondly, once a decision has been made in the design of a system that 
appellate adjudication should be by a specialized tribunal, it follows 
automatically under current thinking that primary adjudication should not 
take place in a court of general jurisdiction. That is unfortunate. There are 
probably some subject areas in which primary adjudication in a court of 
general jurisdiction would make sense, and once it is recognized that 
appellate adjudication is policy making and that it should be goal-oriented, 
it would probably be useful in some situations to have appeals from courts of 
general jurisdiction to specialized tribunals. The incidence of political power, 
however, including judicial power under the Charter, precludes that idea 
from being considered on its merits in any particular subject context. 
68. For further discussion, see T. G. ISON, Accident Compensation : A Commentary on the New 
Zealand Scheme, London, Croom Helm, 1980, p. 107 à 111. 
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Conclusion 
The prerogative power once claimed by Stuart kings of dispensing with 
statute law, and which was buried (one used to think forever) by the Bill of 
Rights'19 in 1688, has been revived for use by the judges. Morever, it is 
unrealistic to expect that this perception of statute law, as being subject to 
judicial veto, will be confined to cases in which charter issues are raised. 
Of course charter litigation has produced revisions in criminal procedure, 
many of which might be seen as beneficial : but these benefits could well have 
been achieved, and with more precision and efficiency, by a new criminal 
procedure statute. Outside the area of criminal procedure, it is very hard to 
find cases in which charter litigation appears to have resulted in any public 
good. 
We have undertaken a massive expansion in the judicialization of public 
policy making. It is dangerous and counter-productive. It enhances the 
political power of those sectors of society that already wielded the greatest 
power and it is a drastic curtailment of democratic choice. The damage also 
includes delays in the decision-making process and a diversion from more 
realistic ways of protecting human rights. In so far as the impact affects the 
pursuit of public policy objectives, it tends to be negative, for example, 
favouring the interests of polluters over the polluted. To the extent that 
judicialization deals with individuals in their relations with government 
officials, it seldom produces any system reform. Its more common successes 
consist only of greasing a few squeaky wheels. 
Of course there are enormous problems with the political processes that 
underlie legislation and executive action. The realities fall short of our more 
idealistic aspirations. To see a solution injudicial review, however, increases 
the problems. 
Charter litigation and administration increase the problems of judicial 
review in the ways mentioned above, including the diversion and waste of 
vast sums of public money. Meanwhile, governments complain of deficit 
problems which are said to require the curtailment of provisions for the 
disabled, the elderly, and other disadvantaged groups. At the same time, 
taxes are being increased. 
Judicial review has not been expanded in a discriminating way, 
following rational analysis of its impact in each context, with the benefits 
and the damage identified, and the former judged to outweigh the latter. The 
incidence of political power has militated against the discriminate use of 
69. 1 Will. & Mar. sess. 2, c. 2. 
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judicial review, favouring its expansion across the board regardless of the 
consequences. Thus judicialization has, particularly through the Charter, 
been perceived as a panacea rather than as a medicine which could have 
beneficial results if carefully prescribed as a remedy with known consequences 
for a diagnosed condition. 
With regard to the Charter, it is too late now in Canada to do anything 
except lament and try to minimise the damage. For the communities 
represented here, however, it may not be too late to utter a warning cry, and 
to hope that no-one here may become The Scorcer's Apprentice. 
